

1 **A major shift in U.S. land development avoids significant losses in forest and**  
2 **agricultural land**

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11

1 **Title:** A major shift in U.S. land development avoids significant losses in forest and agricultural  
2 land

3 **Abstract:** Land development, which typically results from the conversion of lands previously in  
4 agricultural and forest uses, is one of the most fundamental ways in which humans impact the  
5 natural environment. We study the remarkable decline in land development rates across the  
6 conterminous United States over the period 2000-2015, which occurred after development rates  
7 had grown rapidly over the last two decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Despite relatively constant  
8 population growth since 1980, we find that the current annual rate of land development has  
9 declined consistently across several stratifications of the U.S. land base and amounts to less than  
10 25% of the peak rate observed in the mid-late 1990s, implying that the developed land base of the  
11 U.S. has become increasingly dense in recent years. We show that the widespread shift in land  
12 development rates resulted in 7 million acres of avoided land development, roughly half of which  
13 would have come from conversions of previously forested lands. Panel data econometric  
14 estimation indicates that growth in development over the last two decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century was  
15 driven by falling gas prices and, to a lesser extent, rising income levels. Since 2000, however,  
16 income growth has been stagnant while gas prices have risen sharply, and we find that the latter  
17 has played a larger role than population or income in shaping the recent shift towards denser  
18 development. Results illustrate an often overlooked effect of how rising gas prices can indirectly  
19 avoid losses in forest and agricultural land by reducing developed land-use change.

20

## 1 Introduction

2 The conversion of agricultural and forested lands to urban and rural land development has been a  
3 defining feature of the United States landscape over many decades. For example, two-thirds of the  
4 global forest loss to urban development between 2001 and 2015 occurred in the eastern U.S.  
5 (Curtis et al. 2018). Excessive land development that expands the size of urban areas is often  
6 referred to as urban sprawl, and a widespread policy debate has occurred around whether current  
7 development patterns lead to excessive loss of forest and agricultural lands given the number of  
8 damaging impacts that arise from irreversible land-use change (Glaeser and Kahn 2004; Burchfield  
9 et al. 2006; Irwin and Bockstael 2007; Seto et al. 2012; Sorensen et al. 2018). In particular, land  
10 development has been linked to a number of challenges for the food system, such as a loss of  
11 productive farmland (Bren d'Amour et al. 2017; Sorensen et al. 2018; Zuo et al. 2018), net primary  
12 productivity in soils (Imhoff et al. 2004), and pollinators (Wilson and Jamieson 2019). Research  
13 has also found that land development reduces the provision of numerous ecosystem services,  
14 including carbon sequestration and oxygen production (Wang et al. 2019), water quality  
15 (Cumming et al. 2014), and habitat for wildlife (Lawler et al. 2014). Finally, low-density  
16 development has been associated with other social challenges such as higher obesity rates (Zhao  
17 and Kaestner 2010; Ewing et al. 2014), reduced air quality (McCarty and Kaza 2015), increased  
18 vehicle usage and fuel consumption (Bento et al. 2005; Kim and Brownstone 2013), and reduced  
19 upward mobility (Ewing et al. 2016). Since the potential damages from urban sprawl are increasing  
20 in the area of converted land, understanding the trajectory of damages ultimately depends on the  
21 rate of change in land development and its trend over time.

22 Land-use policy can lower damages from land-use change by altering the amount and  
23 configuration of landscapes. While policy design has traditionally been informed by retrospective  
24 analyses of past land-use policy impacts on land-use change (e.g. Andam et al. 2008; Heilmayr et  
25 al. 2020) and by forward-looking projections of land-use change under alternative scenarios (e.g.  
26 Lawler et al. 2014), retrospective analyses of the roles played by the fundamental drivers of land  
27 development can also inform policy for at least three reasons. First, sudden changes in land  
28 development rates indicate changes in the demand for developed land, which influences the effect  
29 that both regulatory policies (e.g. zoning) and incentive policies (e.g. payment-for-ecosystem  
30 service programs) would have on the density of the developed landscape and the stock of natural  
31 and undeveloped lands. Second, since conversion of land to developed use tends to be irreversible,  
32 low-density developed areas with low-connectivity roads will have little ability to adapt to policies  
33 that have indirect effects on land use, such as a carbon price that would alter gas prices (Barrington-  
34 Leigh and Millard-Ball 2015). Third, analyses that quantify the effects of specific drivers of land  
35 development can shed light on which margins and mechanisms policymakers should focus on  
36 when designing land-use and environmental policy.

37 This paper fills two key gaps in the existing literature on land-use change involving the conversion  
38 of forest and agricultural lands to developed uses. First, using a longitudinal federal land-use  
39 database that follows a large sample of private land plots over 1982-2015, we provide a complete  
40 empirical description of a large-scale shift in land-use change that has numerous social and  
41 environmental implications – the reduction in the land development rate that occurred across the

1 conterminous United States (U.S.) during the first 15 years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. While the rate of  
2 land development steadily increased in the 1980s and peaked in the mid-to-late 1990s, the annual  
3 area of land converted to a developed use began a steady decline starting around the year 2000 and  
4 plateaued around 2010 at a level that amounts to less than one-quarter of the peak conversion rate.  
5 The same general trend in recent land development has been documented or suggested in passing  
6 in several prior studies (Barrington-Leigh and Millard-Ball 2015; Homer et al. 2020; Leyk et al.  
7 2020; Cuberes et al. 2021), but the potential causes and consequences of the change in U.S.  
8 development patterns have not been explored in any depth. Beyond describing this aggregate trend,  
9 our analysis further contributes to the land-use change literature by assessing trends in U.S. land  
10 development across multiple strata, including geographical region, pre-existing undeveloped land  
11 use, population density, household income, and commuting cost. We extend this descriptive  
12 analysis by conducting a simple landscape simulation based on plot-level land-use transition  
13 probabilities that allows us to quantify how the relative stock of forest and agricultural land has  
14 been affected by the land development slowdown.

15 The second key contribution of our paper is an econometric analysis of the three fundamental  
16 drivers of land development cited in previous literature, namely population growth, income, and  
17 commuting cost (Brueckner 2000; Glaeser and Khan 2004; and Nechyba and Walsh 2004).  
18 Existing analyses suggest that population growth and income should spur additional  
19 development, while increases in commuting costs should slow development. We construct a  
20 panel-data econometric model to estimate the effects of population, income, and gas prices on  
21 county-level land development rates, thereby allowing us to analyze the relative impact of  
22 observed changes in these three variables on the land development rate slowdown. Our  
23 econometric estimates complement recent studies that show how increases in gas prices can  
24 lower housing construction (Molloy and Shan 2013; Ortuno-Padilla and Fernandez-Aracil 2013),  
25 urban sprawl (Young et al. 2016), and the value of homes far from urban centers (Wu et al.  
26 2019) by estimating how gas price increases also can also lower the rate of change in the amount  
27 of land used for urban development in areas with high commuting costs. The econometric  
28 estimates also highlight a potentially significant connection between land development patterns  
29 and climate mitigation policy. Specifically, since gas prices would rise in response to adoption of  
30 a carbon price proposal, our results highlight how carbon pricing would indirectly conserve  
31 forest and agricultural lands by reducing developed land-use change.

## 32 **Data and methods**

### 33 *Data*

34 Analysis is primarily conducted with the National Resources Inventory (NRI), a plot-level  
35 longitudinal land-use database compiled by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Natural  
36 Resources Conservation Service covering the 1982-2015 period and comprising a sample of over  
37 800,000 points (USDA 2018). A key feature of the NRI database is that it tracks changes between  
38 all major land-use categories. Our main focus is on trends in urban and built-up (or "developed")  
39 land, including conversion from the four major undeveloped NRI land classes: forest, cropland,  
40 pasture, and range. Additional detail on the land-use classes contained in the NRI data are provided  
41 in the Supplemental Materials (SM) Appendix A. The NRI data have been used in a number of

1 previous empirical studies of land-use change (e.g., Lewis and Plantinga 2007; Lubowski et al.  
2 2008; Lawler et al. 2014; Bigelow and Kuethe 2020). We aggregate the plot-level NRI data to the  
3 county level (the finest geographic resolution possible) to generate our main findings concerning  
4 the spatial and temporal pattern of land development across the U.S. Data on other variables that  
5 enter the analysis come from well-known publicly available sources, such as the U.S. Census  
6 Bureau and Energy Information Administration, and are described in greater detail in SM  
7 Appendix A. Our county-level dataset includes the 3,024 counties in the conterminous U.S.  
8 accounted for in all datasets used in the analysis.

### 9 *Descriptive trend analysis*

10 We begin by presenting a set of descriptive trends that depict how the rate of land development  
11 has changed over the 1982-2015 study period. In doing so, we draw comparisons with concurrent  
12 trends in large-scale socioeconomic drivers (population, income, and gasoline prices). To study  
13 the spatial distribution of the land development trend, we decompose the National trend into strata  
14 based on the 1980 quartiles of population density, household income, and commuting cost, and  
15 provide further breakdowns by U.S. state, region, starting land use, and urban classification as  
16 measured by the USDA Economic Research Service's (ERS) 2013 Urban Influence Codes  
17 (USDA, ERS 2013). We also consider the changes in the spatial distribution of the ratio of  
18 population to developed area, a metric we term the "developed area population density", between  
19 1982-2000 and 2000-2015. Calculation of the developed area population density is described in  
20 detail in SM Appendix A.

### 21 *Landscape simulation*

22 The second section of results uses the plot-level NRI land-use transition probabilities to simulate  
23 what the 2015 landscape would have looked like if the pre-2000 land development rate had  
24 continued through the first 15 years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. To compute the cumulative avoided land  
25 development, we adopt an approach used in prior land-use simulation studies (Lewis and Plantinga  
26 2007) that accounts for the fact that any avoided land development must alter the composition of  
27 undeveloped uses in a way that the total landscape size remains fixed. This process generates  
28 transition probabilities  $P_{c,t,j,k}$  defining the probability that an acre of land in county  $c$  in use  $j$   
29 converts to use  $k$  in time  $t$ , which we use to describe the likelihood that an acre of land in a county  
30 either stays in its starting use or converts to an alternative over a 15-year (1982-1997) time step.  
31 SM Table B1 presents these conversion probabilities relative to urban conversions in both the pre-  
32 and post-2000 periods. We omit the 1997-2000 period in calculating  $P_{c,t,j,k}$  so that our 15-year  
33 conversion probability is applied to a consistent time step. A simulated U.S. landscape in 2015 is  
34 generated by fixing the transition probabilities  $P_{c,t,j,k}$  at these initial levels and using them to project  
35 how the landscape would have evolved from 2000 to 2015. We then compare our simulated 2015  
36 landscape with the 2015 observed landscape to illustrate how changes in the probability of land  
37 development have affected the amounts of land remaining in forest, crop, pasture, and range uses,  
38 which account for 95% of all new land developed over our study period (SM Fig. B1).

### 39 *Drivers of land development*

1 The final section of results uses an econometric model to decompose county-level land  
 2 development trends into constituent components stemming from population growth, income, and  
 3 gasoline prices, which are the major drivers of land development cited in the urban economics  
 4 literature (e.g., Brueckner 2000; Nechyba and Walsh 2004). The model we estimate is a linear  
 5 two-way fixed effect regression model of the following form:

$$\begin{aligned}
 6 \quad \widetilde{\text{Dev}}_{c,t} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 PG_{c,t-j} + \beta_2 I_{c,t-j} + \beta_3 P_{c(s),t-j}^G + \beta_4 P_{c(s),t-j}^G \times TT_c \\
 7 \quad & + \gamma 1\{\text{State}_c = s\}t + \tau_t + \alpha_c + \varepsilon_{c,t} \quad (1)
 \end{aligned}$$

8 In equation (1), the dependent variable,  $\widetilde{\text{Dev}}_{c,t}$ , is measured as the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS)  
 9 of the change in developed acres in county  $c$  over the year leading up to year  $t$  (i.e., the net change  
 10 in total developed area between  $t$  and  $t - 1$ ). Using the IHS transformation allows us to include  
 11 county-year observations with zero land developed and yields a similar interpretation to a model  
 12 with a logged dependent variable (Bellemare and Wichman 2020). Explanatory variables enter the  
 13 model in lagged form, where  $j$  denotes the number of years prior to year  $t$  at which the variable is  
 14 measured. Included in the model are population growth over the previous year in county  $c$   
 15 ( $PG_{c,t-j}$ ), median household income in county  $c$  ( $I_{c,t-j}$ ), the price of gasoline the state,  $s$ , where  
 16 county  $c$  is located ( $P_{s(c),t-j}^G$ ), and an interaction term between the price of gasoline and average  
 17 commuting travel time ( $P_{c(s),t-j}^G \times TT_c$ ). For the interaction term,  $TT_c$  is fixed in each county at its  
 18 baseline 1980 level to avoid confounding changes in unobserved factors affecting commuting time  
 19 with changes in development (as in, e.g., Molloy and Shan 2013). The purpose of the interaction  
 20 is to allow for the possibility that gasoline prices have a bigger effect on development in areas with  
 21 higher average commuting costs.

22 An important element of our econometric modeling strategy is how we use the panel structure of  
 23 the data to include county fixed effects ( $\alpha_c$ ), year fixed effects ( $\tau_t$ ), and state-specific linear time  
 24 trends ( $\gamma 1\{\text{State}_c = s\}t$ ), where  $1\{\text{State}_c = s\}$  is an indicator variable for the state,  $s$ , in which  
 25 county  $c$  is located. County fixed effects absorb features of each county that affect land  
 26 development and do not change over the time period of our analysis (e.g., climate and geographic  
 27 amenities that draw migrants such as coastlines, mountains, and other outdoor amenities). Year  
 28 fixed effects absorb land development drivers that are spatially-invariant but time-varying (e.g.,  
 29 interest rates and macroeconomic shocks, such as the Great Recession). State time trends absorb  
 30 land development drivers that are specific to each state and alter the trajectory of development  
 31 over the time period of our analysis (e.g., state government policies that affect land-use, changing  
 32 regional attractiveness for migration). To account for spatial correlation in the model error term,  
 33  $\varepsilon_{c,t}$ , standard errors are clustered by state.

34 To depict results from the econometric estimation, we first compute the average change in each  
 35 explanatory variable over two periods: (a) the last two decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (1980-2000) and  
 36 (b) the first 15 years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century (2001-2015). For income and gasoline price, which enter  
 37 the model in level form, we use the average annual growth in each variable for each of the two  
 38 periods. For population growth, which already enters the model in change form, we compute the  
 39 average value in each of the two periods (as opposed to the change in population growth). We then

1 use the estimated model parameters to estimate the percentage effect on land development  
2 stemming from the observed average annual change in each explanatory factor over the early  
3 (1983-2000) and later (2001-2015) portions of the study period. To highlight the importance of  
4 the observed population, income, and commuting cost drivers, relative to other state-specific  
5 influences, we combine the county and year fixed effects, along with the state-specific trends, to  
6 produce an annualized state-level marginal effect of unobserved land development drivers.

7

## 1 **Results**

### 2 *National trends*

3 Growth in the developed land area of the United States increased throughout the 1980s and into  
4 the 1990s before peaking and undergoing a persistent multidecade decline (Fig. 1A). As of 2015,  
5 the current rate of land conversion (0.47 million acres per year), is less than one-quarter of the  
6 peak development rate that occurred over 1992-1997 (2.04 million acres per year). The downward  
7 trajectory of land development after 1997 predates the Great Recession of 2007-2009 and contrasts  
8 with the contemporaneous trend in new housing starts, suggesting that the declining rate of land  
9 development is marked by an increase in the density of new housing built rather than a slowdown  
10 in construction (SM Fig. B2).


11 In the last two decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (1982-2000), U.S. population growth lagged behind  
12 growth in the developed land base (Fig. 1B), which is consistent with recently documented global  
13 trends (Seto et al. 2010; Angel et al. 2011). In relative terms, the population elasticity of land  
14 development, which we measure as the ratio of the annualized percentage change in developed  
15 land and the annualized percentage change in population, shows that land development has become  
16 increasingly population-inelastic, with the elasticity measure declining from 2.59 in 1982 to 0.7 in  
17 2015 (Fig. 1C). This implies that the stock of developed land has become increasingly dense over  
18 time, which is also corroborated by the cumulative and annual change ratios of population and  
19 developed land shown in SM Fig. B3.

20 The observed trend in land development is in general agreement with trends in two of its major  
21 drivers: income and commuting costs. The last two decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century were marked by a  
22 rise in real median household income, but household income growth was relatively stagnant  
23 between 2000 and 2015 (Fig. 1D). Gasoline prices, a primary component of our measure of  
24 commuting cost, declined rapidly in the early 1980s and remained low until the early 2000s, when  
25 they increased sharply, and have since generally remained higher, though more volatile, than in  
26 the later 20<sup>th</sup> century. Taken together with the trend in land development, the trends in income and  
27 gasoline prices accord with basic economic intuition, suggesting that (i) consumption of land  
28 increases with income and (ii) commuting costs impose a constraint on the geographic extent of  
29 growing urban areas.

30 Lastly, we find that the shift towards denser development patterns has occurred broadly across  
31 urban and rural areas that collectively contain a large majority of the US population. Specifically,  
32 83% of the 2015 U.S. population is found in areas that got denser (as measured by the ratio of total  
33 population to total developed land area) over 2000-2015 compared to 1982-2000 (SM Table B1).  
34 Overall, 90% of counties with any developed land area during our study period (SM Table B2),  
35 and all but one state (Nevada; SM Fig. B4), have developed areas that became more densely  
36 populated over 2000-2015. We further decompose the spatial distribution of development using a  
37 county-level federal urban influence classification system. At least 84% of counties assigned to  
38 each of the 12 urban influence classes are associated with developed areas that got more densely  
39 populated over 2000-2015 relative to 1982-2000 (SM Table B2).

40





2 **Fig. 1.** The last two decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century were characterized by rising land development, a trend that  
 3 reversed course during the start of the 21<sup>st</sup> century (A); development outpaced population growth until the  
 4 end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, when population began to grow at a relatively faster pace (B); in relative terms,  
 5 these trends imply that development has become inelastic with respect to population growth (C); these  
 6 trends are also consistent with those of two main drivers of development, namely income and commuting  
 7 costs (as measured by gasoline prices) (D).

#### 8 *Stratification of land development trend*

9 In general, we find a remarkably consistent decline in land development over 2000–2015 across  
 10 various stratifications of the U.S. land base. The development rate peaked in the mid-late 1990s  
 11 across the quartiles of 1980 county-level population density distribution (Fig. 2A). The densest  
 12 counties experienced the most dramatic reduction in land development, falling from a peak of 1.29  
 13 million acres per year over 1992–1997 to a 2015 level of just 0.23 million acres per year (an 82%  
 14 reduction). As of 2015, over 80 percent of land in the highest density quartile and over 95 percent  
 15 of land in the bottom three quartiles remains undeveloped (SM Fig. B5), suggesting that the decline  
 16 in new land development is not entirely driven by a lack of remaining physical land onto which  
 17 existing developed areas may expand. A similar pattern of land development has also taken place  
 18 across the distribution of median household income in 1980 (Fig. 2B). Intuitively, total land

1 development is positively correlated with median household income. Across all quartiles, current  
2 levels of annual development represent 73-79% percent decreases from their peaks.


3 Counties characterized by above-median average 1980 commuting times generally saw the largest  
4 gains in developed area and, subsequently, the largest declines in the developed area growth rate  
5 after the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century (Fig. 2C). The pattern of declining land development in counties  
6 with the highest commuting times is consistent with prior research documenting a widespread  
7 slowdown in the decline of commuting costs around the year 2000 due to increases in congestion  
8 and the growing trend of urban renewal (Cuberes et al. 2021), as well as increases in gas prices  
9 (Fig. 1D).

10 Fig. 2D shows the land development rate for land being converted from each of the four major  
11 pre-development uses (forest, crop, pasture, and range). In absolute acreage terms, the current  
12 forest land development rate of 0.19 million acres per year has fallen the most off its peak of 0.87  
13 million acres per year, amounting to a 78% rate reduction. This implies that ecosystem services  
14 from forest land, in particular, have been most affected by recent changes in the rate of land  
15 development. Qualitatively similar patterns emerge for crop, pasture, and, to a lesser extent, range.  
16 Lastly, the trend in annual land development persists across broad geographic regions of the U.S.  
17 (Fig. 2E). Most development in the conterminous U.S. takes place in the Southeast and  
18 Northeast/Midwest regions, with the two accounting for roughly 80% of total development in each  
19 year in the study period. This regional development pattern accords with the rankings by pre-  
20 developed use, as a majority of counties in the Northeast/Midwest and Southeast are associated  
21 with forest as the dominant pre-developed use (SM Fig. B6).

### 22 *Simulation of avoided land development*


23 Fig. 3 decomposes the avoided land development by state, starting land use, and RPA region. Had  
24 the land-use change trajectories from the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century continued across 2000-2015, there  
25 would have been an additional 7 million acres of land that would have been developed. States with  
26 large amounts of avoided land development are generally located east of the Mississippi River or  
27 on the Pacific coast. The 36.6% total reduction in newly developed land implies avoided losses  
28 across all major undeveloped land-use categories. In general, there is more avoided deforestation  
29 than avoided losses in agricultural lands. Avoided deforestation amounted to 3.56 million acres,  
30 while avoided cropland loss is 2.06 million acres, most of which is concentrated in the  
31 Northeast/Midwest and Southeast regions. The 1.16 million acres of avoided pasture loss is spread  
32 more evenly throughout the conterminous U.S. Compared to the other three uses, avoided losses  
33 in rangeland are minimal. The spatial distribution of avoided development is attributable to the  
34 existing land base. Forty-one percent of avoided deforestation occurs in the Southeast region  
35 corresponding to the southeast's 39% share of all U.S. forestland. Similarly, 42% of avoided crop  
36 loss occurs in the Northeast/Midwest where approximately 54% of all U.S. cropland is located.

37



1  
 2 **Fig. 2.** The same generic pattern of land development increasing in the last two decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century  
 3 and then declining over the first 15 years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century emerges across several county level  
 4 stratifications, including baseline (1980) population density (A), baseline median household income (B),  
 5 baseline commuting time (C), pre-development land use (D), and broad geographic region (E). See Fig. 3  
 6 for a map of the states comprising the different regions.  
 7

1



	Forest to Urban	Crop to Urban	Pasture to Urban	Range to Urban	Total Urban Acres Avoided
<i>Conterminous U.S.</i>	3,560,887 (40.1%)	2,063,165 (39.6%)	1,166,742 (38.1%)	319,023 (14.1%)	7,109,817 (36.6%)
<i>Northeast/Midwest</i>	1,700,107 (49.4%)	1,214,931 (48.8%)	317,800 (38.2%)	N/A	3,232,838 (47.8%)
<i>Southeast</i>	1,476,018 (31.6%)	647,647 (38.2%)	599,163 (33.6%)	25,365 (3.0%)	2,748,193 (30.5%)
<i>Pacific Coast</i>	323,908 (57.8%)	189,871 (43.7%)	154,915 (63.7%)	289,406 (49.3%)	958,100 (52.5%)
<i>Rocky Mountain/ Great Plains</i>	61,854 (31.0%)	10,716 (1.8%)	93,864 (46.0%)	(4,252) (-0.5%)	162,182 (8.9%)

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**Fig. 3.** Avoided land conversions under observed land development rates. The map shows the total amount of avoided development by state based on the land-use simulation described in the text. The table underneath the map decomposes the regional levels of avoided development by starting undeveloped land use. A similar table for individual states is provided in SM Table B3. Percentage changes are noted in parentheses in the table. There is no range land in the Northeast/Midwest region. SM Table B4 summarizes the transition probabilities used in the calculations.

10

## 1 *Socioeconomic drivers of land development*

2 Population growth has a (weakly) positive effect on land development (Table 1). However,  
3 population growth was not markedly different in the early and later portions of the study period  
4 (0.89 and 0.82 1000s of persons per year, respectively). We estimate that the average annual  
5 population change over 1983-2000 increased annual development by approximately 0.63%, while  
6 the same effect in the later portion of the study period was 0.62%. Median household income  
7 increased by an average of 0.67 per year (\$1000s of \$USD) over 1983-2000, and our estimates  
8 indicate that this increased land development by approximately 3.29% per year. Income stagnation  
9 over 2001-2015 led to a minimal decline in land development of 0.09% per year.

10 Of the three drivers, changes in commuting costs play the largest relative role in driving the  
11 observed patterns of land development. Computed at the average county-level commuting time of  
12 19 minutes, the average annual gasoline price decrease of \$0.05 during the last two decades of the  
13 20<sup>th</sup> century boosted annual land development by 6.06%, while the increase in gasoline prices in  
14 the second half of the study period (\$0.03 annually) decreased land development by 2.84% per  
15 year. The interaction term between gasoline price and 1980 commuting time in the econometric  
16 model shows that the relationship between commuting costs and land development depends on the  
17 amount of time commuters spend traveling to their place of work. In the early part of the study  
18 period, the average change in gasoline price increased development by 6.11-7.12% for counties  
19 with average commuting times longer than 15 minutes, while counties with shorter commuting  
20 times were unaffected by gasoline price changes (Fig. 4). Similarly, in the second half of the study  
21 period, when gasoline prices were increasing, the estimated decrease in land development was  
22 largest for counties characterized by longer commuting times. Counties with average commuting  
23 times over 12 minutes saw a decrease in development ranging from -2.63 to -3.31%, with shorter-  
24 commute counties not seeing any impact. Compared to the average level of development over  
25 1983-2000, the commuting cost impact estimates imply that the average annual increase in  
26 commuting costs over 2001-2015 avoided a cumulative total of 4.19 million acres of new land  
27 development ( $p = 0.012$ ), or roughly 59% of the total avoided land development estimated with  
28 the simulation model.

29 A notable drawback of our estimation strategy is that we are unable to account for changes in land-  
30 use regulations, as well as inherently unobservable time-varying factors such as household  
31 locational preferences. To determine the magnitude and importance of these factors not explicitly  
32 accounted for as measurable independent variables in our model, the final column of Table 1 shows  
33 the weighted average annual effect of unobservable factors (with weights corresponding to the  
34 number of counties in each state), which we estimate by separately combining the year fixed effects  
35 and state-specific trends for the 1983-2000 and 2000-2015 periods. For the early period, our results  
36 indicate that if population, income, and commuting costs had remained fixed over this period,  
37 annual land development would have been 9.07% lower, on average. After the year 2000, however,  
38 the unobservable state trends have a positive average annual effect, but it is not statistically  
39 significant ( $p < 0.05$ ). In SM Tables C2 and C3, we present annual unobservable effects for each  
40 state, which show that the unobservable-induced decline in land development in the early period  
41 was most prominent in in several states with fairly stringent land-use regulations (e.g., New Jersey,

1 Massachusetts, and Oregon), which is consistent with the expected effects of these policies.  
 2 Moreover, the avoided increase in development in these states after 2000 was smallest, but the  
 3 effects are not significant.

4 SM Table C1 presents the raw model coefficients and standard errors used to generate the  
 5 percentage effects. SM Table C4 shows results from omitting  $\alpha_c$ ,  $\tau_t$ , and  $\gamma 1\{State_c = s\}t$  from  
 6 (1) and provides justification for their inclusion in the final specification. The percentage effects  
 7 displayed in Table 2 of the main paper are based on a two-year lag of each explanatory factor. SM  
 8 Table C5 shows results from alternative lags of one and three years. See SM Appendix C for  
 9 additional details on the development of the econometric model and supplemental estimation  
 10 results.

11

12


**Table 1. Regression model of annual land development**

	Population change	Income	Gas price	Unobservable state trends
<i>Panel A: 1983-2000</i>	0.63 (0.33)* [0.89]	3.29 (0.45)*** [0.67]	6.06 (2.90)** [-0.05]	-9.07 (3.90)** [1.00]
<i>Panel B: 2001-2015</i>	0.58 (0.31)* [0.82]	-0.09 (0.01)*** [-0.02]	-2.84 (1.28)** [0.03]	5.80 (14.62) [1.00]

**Notes:** The table presents regression results for a model of county-level annual land development (in acres) over 1983 to 2015. To estimate the model, we use a balanced panel of 3,024 counties, amounting to 99,792 total observations. The outcome variable is transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine function. The model also includes county fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific linear trends. Income and gas prices are adjusted for inflation to 2015 \$USD. All explanatory variables enter the model as two-year lags prior to the year over which land development takes place. Gas price enters in level form and through an interaction with 1980 average commuting time. The effects shown in the table are computed at the average observed commuting time value; see Fig. 4 for how the gas price effect varies across the distribution of commuting time. Average effects implied by the unobservable terms in the model are estimated using a combination of year fixed effects and state-specific trends. All effects represent the percentage change in annual development from increasing each regressor by the average annual change over the period delineated by each panel. For each variable-panel combination, the first entry shows the percentage effect, estimated using Kennedy's (1981) method. The second entry, in parentheses, represents the standard error, estimated using the delta method and based on an original variance-covariance matrix adjusted for clustering at the state level. The third entry, in brackets, represents the average annual change value used to compute the percentage effect. Statistical significance is denoted by the asterisks as follows: 1% (\*\*\*), 5% (\*\*), and 10% (\*).

13

14



1

2 **Fig. 4.** Gasoline prices and land development are inversely related and the magnitude of the relationship  
 3 depends on the amount of time commuters spend traveling to their place of work. Confidence intervals  
 4 based on state-clustered standard errors estimated using the delta method are shown around the point  
 5 estimate corresponding to the percentage effect for each commuting time percentile.

6

## 1 Discussion

2 The main takeaway of our analysis is that land development patterns have become increasingly  
3 dense in the U.S. over the first 15 years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, which has at least three implications  
4 for environmental and land-use policy. First, while the permanent avoidance of losing agricultural  
5 and forest lands to development is the goal of conservation policies adopted across many levels of  
6 governmental and non-governmental organizations, we show that shifts in the fundamental  
7 economic drivers of land-use change can indirectly avoid significant amounts of development.  
8 While there is no guarantee that the shifts documented here will be permanent, they have, at a  
9 minimum, provided more time for land conservation policy to be adopted, which can affect  
10 conservation decision-making due to the generally irreversible nature of land development  
11 (Costello and Polasky 2004).

12 Second, while past literature has documented the effects that gas prices have on vehicle miles  
13 traveled (e.g. Bento et al. 2009) and housing starts (Molloy and Shan 2013), our results indicate  
14 that gas price increases also have an important indirect effect by reducing the rate of land-use  
15 change from undeveloped to developed uses in regions with high commuting costs. A direct  
16 implication of our results is that policy efforts to price carbon – which would lead to gas price  
17 increases – would lower land-use change rates to development. While many studies have  
18 documented how carbon pricing can increase forestland through sequestration payments to  
19 landowners (e.g. Lubowski et al. 2006; Bryan et al. 2014), our results show that carbon pricing  
20 can flatten the trajectory of forestland loss by reducing the incentives for development.

21 Third, there is a widespread push to consider the direct role of land use in the design of climate  
22 policy. Many climate policy proposals involve the preservation and replanting of forested areas to  
23 sequester carbon and mitigate the damages caused by emissions generated elsewhere. To this end,  
24 beyond avoided forestland and agricultural land loss, taking our results one step further implies  
25 that the widespread reduction in land development studied here has resulted in avoided carbon  
26 emissions. Of course, however, the extent to which these avoided emissions become permanent  
27 will be shaped by future trends in the drivers of development and land use policy.

28 Although our analysis presents evidence of a widespread transformation of land-use patterns  
29 across the U.S., there are several important factors our framework does not address. Perhaps most  
30 importantly, we do not model the impact of land-use regulations aimed at curbing the extent of  
31 urban land development due to a lack of consistently measured longitudinal data on land-use  
32 regulations across the conterminous U.S. To the extent that regulations have evolved in ways not  
33 captured by our model (i.e., non-linearly at localized scales), our results should be interpreted with  
34 that caveat in mind.

35 It also bears emphasizing that our results are specific to the United States and not necessarily  
36 representative of a similar global trend in land development. Prior research has documented how  
37 the decline in urban sprawl in the U.S. stands out when compared with trends in other countries  
38 (Barrington-Leigh and Millard-Ball 2020), where rapid low-density urban development does not  
39 appear to show any sign of abating (Seto et al. 2012). Furthermore, we use a broad definition of



1 land development, which contrasts with other recent work considering land development and  
2 population density in large urbanized areas (e.g., Güneralp et al. 2020).

3 Perhaps most importantly, the patterns documented here should not be interpreted as suggesting  
4 that the recent downward trend in land development represents a permanent change. As the Covid-  
5 19 pandemic of 2020-2021 has shown, widespread changes in large-scale economic factors can  
6 occur suddenly and fundamentally alter our day-to-day lives. There has also been speculation that  
7 the pandemic will result in a shift of locational preferences from high- to lower-density areas,  
8 which would put additional pressure to develop new lands in areas already characterized by less  
9 dense development patterns. This shift in preferences would potentially be compounded by a rise  
10 in remote work, which, with continual improvement in remote-work technology, will erode the  
11 accessibility benefits of residing in dense urban areas. While the repercussions of the pandemic  
12 are still unfolding, our research lays the groundwork for future empirical analysis of the effects of  
13 large shocks like the pandemic on land-use patterns.

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